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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
RONALD E. ELLIS and
SARAH ELLIS,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
WANDA F. HATHAWAY,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
12,499

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by Ronald Ellis to recover for personal injuries and by Sarah Ellis for
loss of her husband's support, companionship, love
and affection by reason of the injuries to her husband arising out of a collision between automobiles
driven by Ronald E. Ellis and respondent, Wanda
F. Hathaway.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury who returned a
verdict in defendant's favor. Plaintiff filed a Motion
For New Trial, which was denied by the court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks to sustain the verdict of the
jury and the order of the court denying a new trial.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The automobile accident from which this case
arose happened between 3 :30 and 4 :00 P.M. on De.
cember 7, 1968 (T1·. 262, 263). The accident occur.
red north of Provo, Utah at the intersection of University Avenue (also known as U.S. Highway 189
and SR-7) and 3700 North (also known as SR-78)
(Tr. 19). The day was clear and the road was dry.
In this area University Avenue is a two-lane road
(one lane for traffic in either direction) (Tr. 94,
263). The road extends in a generally north and
south direction (Tr. 20). At the intersection where
this accident occurred University Avenue widens into the equivalent of a five-lane highway (Tr. 262,
20; Exhibit 13). There is one lane on each side of
the road for vehicles making right hand turns
onto or off University Avenue at this intersection. There is one lane on each side of the road for
thrnugh traffic and one lane in the middle of the road
for vehicles coming from either direction and making
left hand turns at this intersection. The defendant
approached the intersection on 3700 North Street,
a two-lane highway (one lane for traffic in either direction) which extends in an east and westerly direction (Tr. 264; Exhibit 13). The intersection is
marked with a flashing semaphore light which
flashes amber for north and south bound traffic and
reel for east and west bound traffic (Tr. 22). The
intersection is also protected by stop signs controlling traffic going east and west on 3700 North (Tr.
2

21). There is a slight slope downhill from University Avenue to 3700 North to the west (the direction
from which the defendant approached) (Tr. 38).
There are some trees north of the intersection on the
west side of University Avenue (Tr. 39-41) and some
highway signs located north of the intersection and
on the west side of University Avenue which make
it somewhat difficult for a driver stopped at the stop
sign on the west side of the intersection to see a car
coming from the north on University Avenue (Tr.
41, 42; Exhibit 3). There is a curve in University
Avenue which the police officer estimated to be a
quarter of a mile away (Tr. 43). These conditions
which affect the ability of drivers to see approaching
traffic make this a dangerous intersection in the opinion of the investigating officer (Tr. 39). The posted speed limit on University Avenue in this area is
60 miles per hour (Tr. 48) . In the opinion of the
investigating officer, in view of the conditions existing at the intersection, this was too fast to travel
through that intersection (Tr. 52 ) .
The defend ant, Wanda Hathaway, was driving
a station wagon at the time of the accident. Four of
her five children, ages 4 through 12, were passengers in the automobile. The oldest child was in the
front on the right-hand side and the three younger
children in the back (Tr. 262) . The defendant had
been shopping at a shopping mall in the area and was
returning home at the time of the accident (Tr. 263).
She was traveling east. She does not recall whether
3

there were any cars in front of her as she approached
the intersection. When she reached the intersection
she stopped at the stop sign located on the southwest
corner. At that time there were no cars ahead of her
(Tr. 265). She looked both ways but saw no cars
approaching on University Avenue (Tr. 266). She
then drove her car up and onto University Avenue.
As she did so she observed the plaintiffs' car approaching from the north and stopped her automobile (Tr. 266) entirely within the right lane or right .
turning lane of University Avenue (Tr. 266, 275).
As she was stopped she observed the plaintiffs' car
swerving to the right and knew that it was going to
hit her, after which the collision occurred (Tr. 266).
I

Plaintiff Ronald E. Ellis approached the intersection from the north at a speed of 50 to 60 miles
per hour (Tr. 95). As he approached he observed
three cars enter the highway from the west going
east. One or two probably went across the highway
and one turned north (Tr. 96). As the plaintiff observed these three cars he took his foot off the gas.
He came so close to the last of these three cars that
he became concerned that he might hit it (Tr. 138).
As he took his eyes off of the last of these three cars
he saw the station wagon which was nearly stopped
(Tr. 95). He immediately turned his wheel to the
right and hit his brakes. The front of his automobile
struck the defendant's automobile in the left door,
after which the automobile swung around, coming
to rest in the position shown on Exhibits 1, 3 and 13.
4

The police officer placed the area of impact somewhere in the vicinity shown by the circle on Exhibit
13, partially on the line dividing the right turn lane
and the through lane on the west side of the road (Tr.
23), mostly over into the outside lane of traffic (Tr.
142). The Hathaway vehicle came to rest entirely
within the outside lane of traffic. The Ellis vehicle
came to rest mostly in the outside or right lane, but
with the back of the car extending into the middle or
through lane (Exhibits 1 and 2). After the accident
there was room to go around the two vehicles by traveling in the left-hand lane (Exhibit P-1, P-3) and in
the officer's opinion, presuming the Hathaway vehicle was stopped in the outside lane of traffic, there
was sufficient room for the Ellis vehicle to have passed in front of her vehicle before the collision (Tr. 44).
The Ellis vehicle laid down skid marks shown in
plaintiffs' Exhibit P-1 and P-3 which start well over
in the middle or through lane of traffic and turn to
the right or over into the outside or right-turn lane
of traffic up to the point of impact (Exhibit P-1,
P-3). The plaintiff testified that he was unable to
stop after he saw the Hathaway vehicle. His automatic reflex was to turn to the right (Tr. 131-8).
This appears to be borne out by the direction of the
skid marks in Exhibits P-1 or P-3. The officer testified that he did not measure the skid marks (Tr. 44).
Before this accident the plaintiff had been involved in a number of automobile accidents in which
he had been injured. In 1959 he was involved in an
5

accident in Provo Canyon and was hospitalized in
Heber (Tr. 138, 139). In 1964 he was driving latR
at night on a narrow, winding road near Provo when
he struck a bridge abutment. He was thrown forward i
into the steering wheel, breaking his nose (Tr. 139,
140). In November of 1968, a week before the accident in the present case, he was in an accident in
Idaho (Tr. 141). He was driving on a country road
when another automobile delivering newspapers pulled across the left-hand lane of traffic into his lane. He :
pulled his car to the right in an effort to miss him
but struck the right front fender of the other car with ·
his left rear fender. The next day he experienced back
pain which lasted two days (Tr. 102) and prevented ·
him from driving his car back to Utah on the third .
day (Tr. 102). During that period he had difficulty
getting out of a chair or walking (Tr. 141). Plaintiff testified that his pain had subsided and that he
was not aware of any pain in his neck or back when
he was involved in the accident of December 7, 1968
which is the subject of this action. Also, prior to the
accident of December 7, 1968, the plaintiff had sustained an industrial injury to the carpal nerve canal
of his hand. Because of this injury his hand had been
operated on by Dr. Eugene Robertson of Provo (Tr.
103).
1

After the accident which is the subject of this
action plaintiff retained an attorney in Provo, James
W. Nixon, to represent him in the negotiations for
the settlement of any claim he might have against the
6

defendant (Tr. 72, 73). On January 7, 1969 the
plaintiff and his lawyer met with Alan Thomas of
Farmers Insurance to negotiate a settlement (Tr.
73). Prior to that time plaintiff had seen Dr. Eugene Robertson at the emergency room of the Utah
Valley Hospital, where he had been taken immediately after the accident (Tr. 104, 81). His attorney had
also suggested that he see another doctor about possible further back injuries (Tr. 91). At that time
the only claims which the plaintiff and his attorney
made for personal injuries were for the re-injury to
his hand and for headaches which the plaintiff had
suffered for several weeks immediately after the accident. These headaches were no longer bothering
him on January 7th. Both the plaintiff and defendant
had insurance with the same company. The plaintiff's policy provided collision coverage and reimbursement for medical expenses (Tr. 74, 155). As
a result of the negotiations of January 7th the plaintiff was paid $3,499.00 in two drafts (Tr. 83) the first, which was paid under his policy, was for
$2,640.00 for the damage to his automobile (from
which no deductible was taken because the same insurer covered both automobiles) (Tr. 82, Exhibit
15) ; and the second, which was paid under the defendant's policy, was for $859.00 in consideration of
which a release was taken of all claims against the
defendant (Tr. 86, Exhibit 14). The $859.00 payment consisted of $361.00 for car rental and $498.00
for personal injuries. (Tr. 75, 76).
7

As stated, the insurance company also afforded
medical coverage to the plaintiff under his policy and,
after the settlement of January 7, 1969, it paid to
the plaintiff an additional $1,085.88 under the medical provision of his policy for medical expense allegedly incurred by the plaintiff because of the accident
which is the subject of this action and the accident
which occurred a week earlier in Idaho on November
30, 1968 (Tr.155), makinga total of $4,574.88which
the plaintiff received either under coverage afforded
by the defendant's policy or the coverage afforded
under his policy (Tr. 156), no part of which
the plaintiff had ever offered to pay back at the time
this case was tried (Tr. 156).
On January 20, 1969, approximately a month
and a half after the accident which is the subject of
this case, the plaintiff claims that while he was lying
on his back under a car removing and replacing the
oil pan with his arm in an up-raised position he experienced pain in the shoulders and the neck (Tr.
112). Thereafter he went to see Dr. Kyle Clark (Tr.
113), who referred him to Dr. Eugene Chapman (Tr.
113). Dr. Chapman diagnosed the condition in his
back as an acute chronic strain of the cervical spine
(Tr. 181). When the plaintiff saw Dr. Chapman he
failed to tell him about the accident which had occurred in Idaho on November 30, 1968 or of the other
previous accidents (Tr. 205, 168). The doctor's testimony was based on the assumption that the plaintiff's complaints began with the accident of Decem8

ber 7, 1968 (Tr. 201). On March 7, 1970 the plaintiff was involved in another accident. He was at a
stop sign in Heber, Utah waiting for traffic to clear
so he could enter a highway when another car came
out of a parking lot and struck his car over the rear
tire. Because of that accident he suffered increased
pain in his back for approximately six weeks (Tr.
124) and continued to see Dr. Chapman (Tr. 186).
The plaintiff has made a claim against each of the
drivers in the accidents of November 30th, December
7, 1968 and March 7, 1970. He contends that the injuries received in the accident of November 30, 1968
were confined to an area of his back other than the
neck (Tr. 144, 145) ; that his injuries sustained in
the accident which is the subject of this case (December 7, 1968) were confined to his neck; and the injuries sustained on March 7, 1970 were confined to
an aggravation of the previous injuries which he had
received (Tr. 147).
By his Complaint ( R. 3-5) the plaintiff Ronald
Ellis sought to recover for physical and emotional
injuries plus doctor and hospital bills allegedly resulting from the accident of December 7, 1968. The
plaintiff, Sarah Ellis, in her Complaint (R. 3-5)
sought recovery for the loss of companionship, love
and affection allegedly sustained by her because of
her husband's injuries. The defendant filed an Answer admitting the occurrence of the accident but
denying the other allegations of plaintiffs' Complaints and alleging as an affirmative defense to the
9

Complaint of Ronald Ellis the settlement of January
7, 1969 and the release signed by Ronald Ellis (Exhibit 14). Thereafter, the defendant moved the court
( R. 44) to dismiss the Complaint of Sarah Ellis
against the defendant, there being no right of the
plaintiff Sarah Ellis to recover from the defendant
by reason of injuries to her husband. The defendant
also moved the court to order a separate trial on the
issue of whether or not the plaintiff Ronald Ellis had
released the defendant, Wanda Hathaway, from any
and all claims, demands or damages arising from the
accident of December 7, 1968 (R. 45). Both of these
motions were denied ( R. 55-56). The defendant then
filed a Motion For Pretrial, which came before the
court on February 5, 1971. The Motion was in effect
denied, the court ordering the matter continued until
the time of trial (R. 51, 55).
At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' evidence at
the trial the defendant renewed her Motion To Dismiss the action of Sarah Ellis because there was no
action in the State of Utah in behalf of a wife for loss
of consortium or for damages or injuries to her husband ( R. 238). She also moved the court to dismiss
the action of Ronald Ellis on the ground that he had
failed to tender back the consideration he had received for the contract of settlement (R. 14) in the
amount of $859.00 (R. 237, 238). Both of these Motions were denied ( R. 260). The defendant then submitted a Special Verdict outlining the issues in the
case ( R. 261, 91 ) , the form of which does not appear
10

in the Record although requested as part of the transcript on appeal ( R. 155). This was in effect denied
by the court when it submitted the respective claims
of the plaintiffs to a jury on a general verdict (R. 13,
132). At the conclusion of the trial the defendant
made a Motion For Directed Verdict in the case
brought by Ronald Ellis on the ground that his action
was barred by his failure to tender the money before
attempting to set aside the release (R. 305). A similar motion was made in the case of Mrs. Ellis on the
ground that there was no action for loss of consortium by the wife for an injury to her husband (R.
305) and on the further ground that the evidence
showed that the negligence of Ronald Ellis was at
least a proximate cause of the accident and injuries
of which he complained. Both Motions were denied.
The case was subsequently submitted to a jury
who returned verdicts in the defendant's favor in
both cases (R. 131-132). Thereafter, a Motion For
Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict, Motion for
an Additure or in the Alternative a Motion For New
Trial was filed by the plaintiffs (R. 138), which were
denied by the court. ( R. 14 7) .
POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY THAT THERE COULD BE NO RECOVERY IF THIS WAS AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT.

The plaintiffs' first claim of error on the part
of the court was that the court gave Instruction No.
11

11 on unavoidable accident, which was not requested
by either counsel for the plaintiffs or the defendant.
Under the evidence in this case, it was proper for the
court to give the instruction on unavoidable accident
because the evidence supports the conclusion that the
collision in this case may have occurred without negligence on the part of either party. Even if the instruction was erroneously given, it was not prejuthe other instructions presented the
dicial
issues to the jury in a clear and understandable manner.
This court has repeatedly approved the use of
an "unavoidable accident" instruction. In Porter vs.
Price, 11 Utah 2d 80, 355 P.2d 66 ( 1960), the defendant was a diabetic who suffered insulin shock
while driving and collided with a parked car in which
the plaintiff was sitting. The defendant was a well
regulated diabetic with no history of severe insulin
reactions. The court gave an "unavoidable accident"
instruction and the jury returned a verdict of "no
cause of action." The Supreme Court affirmed because "much of the evidence tended to show circumstances beyond the control of a reasonable man ... "
(Emphasis added) Jd.at83.
This holding was re-affirmed in Woodhouse vs.
Johnson, 20 Utah 2d 210, 436 P.2d 442 (1968), in
which the defendant, while backing out of a driveway, ran over a three year old child. The trial court
gave an instruction on "unavoidable accident" and
the Jury returned a verdict of "no cause of action."
12

Id. at 212. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
the instruction was proper because there was nothing
further that the defendant should have done in the
exercise of reasonable care.
In an annotation in 65 A.L.R. 2d 12, 60 several
cases are cited which hold that "unavoidable accident" instructions were properly given because the
driver's view had been obstructed. In Fuller vs. N eunr
dorf, 293 P.2d 317 (Okla. 1956) the plaintiff and
defendant drove toward each other on two intersecting roads. Their ability to see each other was obscured by a crop of wheat and high ground between them.
Even though either party could have seen the other
party's lights reflected on the road, the court held that
both drivers acted reasonably and an "unavoidable
accident" instruction was properly given.
It is clear that the jury could have found that
the accident in the present case occurred without negligence by either party. The evidence clearly supports
the view that the defendant properly stopped at the
stop sign (Tr. 42, 265). She then looked both ways
on University Avenue and could not see any cars approaching (Tr. 265, 266). The defendant's ability to
see cars approaching from the north was impaired
by the slope in the road (Tr. 41), several highway
signs (Tr. 41) and some trees near the road (Tr. 41,
271, 273). The defendant pulled away from the stop
sign, still looking for approaching cars, and stopped
as soon as she saw the Ellis vehicle approaching (Tr.
266). She was able to stop her car completely in the
13

lane reserved for vehicles making right hand turns.
(Tr. 275).
.
1

There is also support for the view that the plaintiff was not negligent. He approached the intersection at the legally posted speed of 60 miles per hour
(Tr. 45, 95). His attention was then diverted by
three cars which entered University Avenue immediately before the defendant. The plaintiff was concerned about these cars and watched them carefully
as they proceeded (Tr. 95). When the last of the cars
was out of the way he looked back and saw the defendant's car moving into the intersection. He may
have thought she was going to continue into his lane
of traffic and he reacted quickly, hitting his brakes
and swerving to the right in an attempt to go behind
her (Tr. 95). However, the defendant had stopped
in the turn lane and the plaintiff collided with the
defendant.
Therefore, because the evidence reasonably supp01·ted a conclusion that neither party to the accident was guilty of negligence, the instruction on "unavoidable accident" was properly given.
Even if the court did commit error in delivering
an instruction on ''unavoidable accident" in this case,
the error was not prejudicial. In Callahan vs. Wood,
24 Utah 2d 8, 465 P.2d 169 (1970), the plaintiff sat
in a stalled, unlighted car which was parked in the
middle of a highway on a dark, foggy night. The defendant was driving along the road and collided with
14

the stalled car. The jury found for the defendant and
the plaintiff appealed, claiming that the trial court
had erred by instructing the jury on "unavoidable accident." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
the "unavoidable accident" instruction was erroneous but not prejudicial. The court said:
" ... the issue of whether the submission
of this improper instruction constitutes reversible error must be determined by whether the
parties were given a fair trial and had the issues of fact and the applicable law presented
to the jury in a clear and understandable manner." Id. at 11, 465 P.2d at 171.
In Instruction No. 2 the court outlined the
claims of the respective plaintiffs, including their
claims of negligence on the part of the defendant and
the defenses raised by the defendant, Wanda F.
Hathaway, including her denial of negligence. By Instruction No. 6 the jury was instructed as to the elements of negligence and proximate cause which the
plaintiff Ronald E. Ellis had the burden of proving
before he could recover against the defendant. By
Instruction No. 7 the jury was instructed as to the
elements of negligence and proximate cause which
the plaintiff Sarah Ellis must prove in order to enable her to recover against the defendant. In Instruction No. 8 the jury was instructed that the plaintiffs
could not recover even though the jury should -find
that the defendant, Wanda Hathaway, was guilty of
negligence if they found that the plaintiff, Ronald E.
Ellis, was himself guilty of negligence which was the
15

proximate cause of the accident. The jury was fur.
ther told in that Instruction that the burden of proy.
ing contributory negligence was on the defendant.
In Instruction No. 21 the court instructed the jury
as to the duty of the defendant, Wanda Hathaway, to
stop at the entrance to the through highway where a
stop sign or other traffic control device has been
erected. Also, she had the duty to yield the right of
way to vehicles which have entered the intersection
or are approaching on a through highway so closely
as to constitute an immediate hazard. In Instruction
No. 22 the jury was instructed as to the speed limit
in the area, and in Instruction No. 23 the court instructed the jury upon the elements which the plaintiff Ronald E. Ellis had the burden of p1·oving before
the Release which he signed in settlement of his claim
could be set aside. It should be noted that the court
did not instruct the jury that this would be a defense
to the action b1·ought by both plaintiffs, but instructed the jury that if they should find the Release was
valid it constituted a defense only to the action
brought by Ronald E. Ellis and not to the action
brought by Sarah Ellis. In Instructions Nos. 24 and
25 the court instructed the jury that the Release was
not binding on the plaintiff if in fact they found that
both the plaintiff and the defendant's agent, Alan
Thomas, were mistaken as to the injuries suffered
by the plaintiff at the time of entering into the Re·
lease. The instructions also stated that should they
find that there was a mutual mistake they should
16

then go on to determine the other issues in the case.
The other instructions in the case were the usual
stock instructions having to do with burden of proof,
conside1·ation of evidence, damages and the like.
The plaintiffs claim that the "unavoidable accident" instruction was given prejudicial effect because "it distorts the entire thrust of the case ... "
(Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 7). The plaintiffs then state:
"The real issue in the case was whether
or not the plaintiff, Ronald Ellis, was bound
by the provisions of the release. Instead of focusing on the real issue, the court introduced
a new issue into the case upon which the jury
conld very well have determined was the real
issue in the case and it is more probable than
not that the jury conside1·ed the possibility of
an unavoidable accident before it deliberated
on the technical and legal ramifications of
the i·elease." Id. at 12.
Therefore, the plaintiff rests his claim that the
instruction was prejudicial solely on his assertion
that the instruction caused the jury to confuse the
issue of negligence with the issue of the release. The
rlefendant agrees that the release was a fundamental issue in this case. However, the defendant attempted to avoid any such confusion when she made
a motion to try the issue of the release separately, before the issue of negligence was tried ( R. 45). The·
plaintiff opposed this motion and the trial judge denied it ( R. 135). Therefore, any confusion caused by
trying these issues together, which the plaintiff con17

tends is prejudicial error, was caused solely by his,
opposition to defendant's motion for separate trials.'
The court has dealt with this situation before.
In Ludlow vs. Colorado Animal By-Products Com.·,
pany, 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347 ( 1943) the respon.'
dents brought a suit for an injunction and damages
against the owners of a rendering plant which was
operated in an agricultural area. The trial court denied the injunction but granted damages. One of the
appellant's assignments of error was a claim that the
court had denied appellant a jury trial. The Supreme
Court, in affirming, noted that the appellant had opposed respondent's motion for a jury trial. The court
said:
"A party who takes a position which eith·
er leads a court into error or by conduct approves the error committed by the court, cannot later take advantage of such error in procedure." Id. at 234, 137 P.2d at 354.

Ludlow is clearly decisive in the present case
because any confusion which may have existed in the
jury's mind was induced solely by the plaintiff's
opposition to the defendant's motion for separate
trial. The plaintiff should not be allowed to take advantage of error induced solely by him.
POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT
WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The plaintiffs claim that the trial court com18

mitted prejudicial error by failing to give plaintiffs'
Requested Instructions Nos. 1 and 2 ( R. 59, 60)
which stated:
"You are instructed that the Court finds
as a matter of law that the defendant, Wanda
F. Hathaway, was guilty of negligence which
was the proximate cause of the collision in this
case.
"You are instructed that the defendant in
failing to remain stopped at the stop sign and
in failing to see the plaintiff, Ronald E. Ellis,
was negligent as a matter of law."
The trial judge acted properly in refusing to instruct the jury that the defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
This Court has repeatedly and uniformly held
that it vvill consider the evidence in a light most farnrable to the prevailing party in determining whether the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were properly submitted to the jury. Toomer's
Estate vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 121
Utah 37, 239 P.2d 163 (1951); Great Anierican lnde111.11 ity Company vs. Berryessa, 122 Utah 243, 248
P.2d 367 ( 1952) ; Coornbs vs. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381,
275 P.2d 680 (1954).
The Court has also stated, in dicta, that a driver
does not commit negligence as a matter of law by
"edging" into a through street to check for oncoming
traffic when his view from a stop sign is obstructed.
In McJimkin vs. Chase, 11 Utah 2d 238, 357 P.2d
19

490 ( 1960), the defendant stopped at a stop sign and
looked for traffic on the through street. She testified
that she then "edged" into the through street because ·
she did not have a clear view of oncoming traffic. i
The defendant's car then collided with a motorcycle
which may have been speeding. The jury returned
a verdict of "no cause of action" against the plaintiff who was a passenger on the motorcycle.
I

I

The Supreme Court reversed, saying that the i
court had committed prejudicial error by instructing
the jury that the plaintiff, who was merely a passenger on a speeding motorcycle, could have been guilty
of contributory negligence. However, in reversing
the court specifically stated that the question of whe·
ther the defendant was negligent in moving forward
into traffic to get a better view was one for the jury.
1

In the present case the trial court properly refused to instruct that the defendant was negligent
as a matter of law under the standards set in McJunkin. The facts revealed that the defendant was not
negligent. The evidence clearly supports the view
that the defendant properly stopped at the stop sign
(Tr. 42, 265). She then looked both ways on U niversity Avenue and could not see any cars coming (Tr.
265, 266). The defendant's ability to see cars approaching from the north was impaired by the slope
in the road (Tr. 41), several highway signs (Tr. 41)
and some trees near the road (Tr. 41, 271, 273). The
defendant pulled away from the stop sign, still looking for approaching cars, and stopped as soon as she
20

i

1

1

saw the Ellis vehicle approaching (Tr. 266). She was
able to stop her car completely in the lane reserved
for vehicles making right turns (Tr. 275).
Therefore, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party and following the
standard stated in McJunkin, defendant's negligence
was at least a question for the jury since the jury
might reasonably have found the defendant exercised
the care which a reasonable man should have exercised. The court properly refused to give plaintiffs'
Requested Instructions Nos. 1 and 2.
POINT III
THE DENIAL BY THE TRIAL JUDGE OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO VIEW THE SCENE
WAS PROPER BECAUSE IT FAILED TO CONSTITUTE "PALPABLE ABUSE" OF HIS DISCRETION.

The appellant claims that the denial of his Motion to allow the jury to view the scene is prejudicial
error. Respondent submits that there are three reasons why the denial of this Motion was proper. First,
it is well established in Utah that the power of a trial
judge to allow the jury to view the scene is a
discretionary power. Under this rule the trial
judge's denial of such a motion constitutes prejudicial error only if he palpably abuses his discretion.
A second reason that reduces the impact of the denial
of this motion is the very limited function which a
jury view has under Utah law; it can only assist in ·
interpreting and resolving conflicts in the evidence,
it cannot by itself constitute competent evidence. A
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third reason was that the intersection at which the
accident occurred was substantially changed in the i
twenty-seven months between the accident and the
trial. Therefore, because of the discretionary nature
of the trial judge's power, because of the limited function which a jury view may properly serve and because of the substantial and material changes which
have been made at this intersection between the time
of the accident and the trial, the denial of plaintiff's
Motion to view the scene failed to constitute prejudicial error.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47(j),
states that:
"When in the opinion of the Court it is
proper for the jury to have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the
place in which any material fact occurred, it
1nay order them to be conducted . . . to the
place ... " (Emphasis added).
In Balle vs. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P. 2d 224
( 1932) , the Court set the standard for the exercise of
the trial judge's discretion in this area. The plaintiff sued for injuries received in a two-car collision
in Ogden Canyon. The defendant, the driver of the
other car, claimed that the plaintiff had committed
contributory negligence by riding in the single seat
of a Model T Ford with four other teenagers. The defendant appealed from a verdict for the plaintiff,
claiming that her contributory negligence would have
been demonstrated by having the jury view the five
teenagers sitting in a similar car. The trial judge
1

I
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denied the defendant's Motion because the teenagers
had grown and the original car had been destroyed.
The Supreme Court affirmed, saying:
"Permitting of a view by the jury of articles or property involved in litigation where
the making of experiments of the kind proposed outside of the Court is a matter so largely in
the discretion of the trial court that its decision idll not be disturbed except for palpable
abuse." Id. at 234 (Emphasis added)
Under this standard the denial of a motion to
allow the jury to view the scene would fail to constitute reversible error except in extreme circumstances. As stated in an annotation in 85 A.L.R. 2d
512 at 513:
"Because of the large discTetion which is
necessarily given to the trial court in determining whether to permit the jury to view the
scene of an accident, the appellate courts rarely find a Teversible error in this respect." (Emphasis added) .
The second factor which makes a view of the
scene less important and, therefore, less likely to constitute prejudicial error is the limited purpose which
it may serve in Utah. In Weber Basin Water Conservancy District vs. Moore, 2 Utah 2d 254, 272 P.2d
166 ( 1954) , the court allowed the jury to view land
involved in a condemnation suit. The verdict was
$1,800.00 more than the competent evidence, including appraisals, would support. On appeal the respondent claimed that the view of the scene was competent evidence which could support the jury verdict.
The Supreme Court rejected this contention and re23

versed, saying that the function of a view of the pre111 .
ises was not to supply evidence totally lacking, "but
rather to assist in interpreting and resolving di ff erences in evidence adduced under appropriate rules
and procedures." Id. at 255.
Third, the denial of the motion was also proper
because the scene was different at the time of trial.
In Balle, supra, the trial judge denied the motion because the circumstances had changed; the original car
had been destroyed and the occupants had gained
weight and grown. In the present case there is competent and uncontroverted evidence proving that the
accident scene changed substantially in the twenty.
seven months between the accident and the trial. Officer Hoyt testified that during this time the State
Highway Department had re-done the intersection,
moved several utility poles, changed the arrangement
of the semaphores and widened part of the intersec·
ti on (Tr. 33).
In the present case there was sufficient competent evidence to clearly describe the scene to the jury.
There were six photographs which showed the accident scene from different angles (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1-6). Four of the witnesses saw the intersection
on the day of the accident (Officer Hoyt, Nile Davis,
Ronald E. Ellis and Wanda F. Hathaway) and the
scene was described in detail by two of them (Officer
Hoyt, Tr. 20-22, 33; Wanda Hathaway, Tr. 263-265).
Officer Hoyt also drew a scale map of the intersection
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which was admitted in evidence (Plaintiff's Exhibit
13). Even if conflicts were present in this evidence, a view of the scene would not have performed
the only function which it legitimately could perform,
that of resolving differences in the evidence.
The A.L.R. Annotation, supra, at 513 states
that "the party who moves for a view has the burden
of showing that no material change has taken place
since the accident." Therefore, the plaintiff in this
case had the burden of showing that no material
change had taken place in the interval between the
accident and the trial. The plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence showing that the intersection had
not been changed, that the trees near the intersection
had not grown or been pruned or removed. He also
failed to introduce evidence showing that the snowfall at the time of the trial was similar to that at the
time of the accident or that the difference was inconsequential.
Therefore, because the plaintiff did not meet
his burden of proof and because there was competent
evidence of material changes in the intersection, the
trial judge did not "palpably abuse" the discretion
granted to him. He acted properly in determining
that a visit to the scene would fail to serve the only
purpose which it legitimately could serve, that of clarifying the evidence.
25

CONCLUSION

The plaintiffs and appellants complain that they
were not given a fair trial in the case by reason of the
fact that the court gave an instruction on unavoidable
accident which, when coupled with the issue of the
validity of the Release, confused the jury to the prejudice of the plaintiffs. They further assert that the
court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the defendant was negligent as a matter of law and in re·
fusing to permit the jury to view the premises where
the accident happened.
The results of the case indicate that the jury was
not confused by reason of the fact that they returned
a verdict against both plaintiffs, even though in·
structed that the defense of whether a Release had
been signed applied only to the action brought by
Ronald Ellis. This clearly illustrates that the jury
understood the instructions and decided that the defendant, Wanda Hathaway, was not guilty of any
negligence which was a proximate cause of the injuries and damages of which the plaintiffs complain.
This result is clearly supported by the evidence, viewing it in the light most favorable to the defendant:
that the defendant stopped at the stop sign, looked
in both directions for oncoming traffic and, being
unable to see any, continued slowly into the intersection. As soon as it should have become reasonably apparent to her that the plaintiffs' car was approaching, she immediately stopped her car in the right turn
lane or outside lane of traffic, allowing sufficient
26

room for the plaintiff to pass through the intersection without incident. Moreover, the evidence clearly
supports the proposition that the accident may have
been unavoidable on both drivers' part - first, because the defendant exercised reasonable care in entering the intersection as pointed out above; and second, in that the plaintiff was traveling within the
posted speed limit, his attention was diverted from
the Hathaway car by the other cars which were proceeding through the intersection and when this danger had passed and he again devoted his attention to
the cars which may have been entering the intersection it was too late to avoid the collision. The
instruction on unavoidable accident was not prejudicial in view of the fact that the other instructions
of the court adequately presented the issues on negligence and proximate cause to the jury. Any confusion
which may have been created in the jury's mind by
ha,·ing the defense raised by the defendant, to-wit,
that the plaintiff Ronald Ellis had signed the release,
coupled with the other issues in the case going to negligence, proximate cause and damages, was induced
by the conduct of plaintiffs' counsel. He opposed the
respondent's motion for a separate trial of those issues. He failed to concur with the defendant's request
that those issues be submitted separately to the jury.
While it does not appear affirmatively by the Record,
he failed to request a pretrial of the action as requested by the defendant.
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Plaintiffs' claim that the defendant, Wanda
Hathaway, was guilty of negligence as a matter
law is not supported by the record, as illustrated by
part of the argument having to do with unavoidable iI
accident. His request that the jury be permitted to I
view the premises was properly denied by the comt;
in view of the fact that it had been twenty-seven!
months since the accident had occurred, in which per-!
iod of time the intersection where the accident occurred and the circumstances which existed at the time I
of the accident had been materially changed. While
no point is made over it in this appeal, the record further indicated that the court ruled in the plaintiffs'
favor on two issues which may have constituted error
except that the jury verdict rendered them moot.
First, the court refused to dismiss Sarah Ellis' action :
claiming loss of consortium for injuries to her hus-1
band; and second the court ruled that the plaintiff, :
Ronald Ellis, was entitled to bring this action and
submit the question to a jury in spite of the fact that
he had signed a Release for the injuries and damage
which he sustained and had not tendered back to the
defendant the consideration for which he signed the
Release.
1
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In view of all the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the plaintiffs received a fair trial, that
they were not prejudiced by any instructions or other
28

error committed by the court and that the jury verdict and the court's denial of the plaintiffs' Motion
For New Trial should be sustained.

Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT

Don J. Hanson
520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for
Respondent
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